Humans feel a sense of agency over the effects their motor system causes. This is the case for manual actions such as pushing buttons, kicking footballs, and all acts that affect the physical environment. We ask whether initiating joint attention -causing another person to follow our eye movement -can elicit an implicit sense of agency over this congruent gaze response. Eye movements themselves cannot directly affect the physical environment, but joint attention is an example of how eye movements can indirectly cause social outcomes. Here we show that leading the gaze of an on-screen face induces an underestimation of the temporal gap between action and consequence (Experiments 1 and 2). This underestimation effect, named 'temporal binding,' is thought to be a measure of an implicit sense of agency. Experiment 3 asked whether merely making an eye movement in a nonagentic, non-social context might also affect temporal estimation, and no reliable effects were detected, implying that inconsequential oculomotor acts do not reliably affect temporal estimations under these conditions. Together, these findings suggest that an implicit sense of agency is generated when initiating joint attention interactions. This is important for understanding how humans can efficiently detect and understand the social consequences of their actions.
Introduction
The effects our motor system have on the environment need to be accurately detected. Action monitoring in humans gives rise to a sense of agency whereby we become conscious of our own actions (Gallagher, 2000) . Such actions might be grasping objects or pushing buttons. However, some of the most important actions we execute do not directly affect the non-social, physical world, but do affect the social world. That is, some actions lead to changes in other people 's actions (e.g. Caspar, Christensen, Cleeremans, & Haggard, 2016) . One such ubiquitous social action is that when we look somewhere, other humans may spontaneously reorient their own gaze in the same direction, thus establishing joint attention (Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007) . Joint attention is an everyday but important example that shows that, although eye movements cannot directly affect inanimate objects (aside from modern emerging gaze-controlled technologies, Slobodenyuk, 2016), changes in our gaze direction can influence other people. Moreover, saccades are the most common action we perform; we foveate a new area of the visual field 3-5 times each second (Schiller, 1998) . However, there is little evidence that saccades evoke a sense of agency in a similar way to manual actions. We, therefore, tested whether an implicit sense of oculomotor agency over a conspecific's gaze shift response emerges in joint attention.
Because eye movements are a special form of action, they may not necessarily engage the same mechanisms underpinning agency as those engaged by other effectors. Nevertheless, there is a clear advantage in having robust agency detection systems for social outcomes elicited by our own actions, so a common mechanism that generalises between all effectors and outcome types could also be posited. Efficiently detecting the social effects we have caused may be critical to understanding others' actions and support mental state ascription (Happé, Cook, & Bird, 2016) . Thus, the importance of understanding the role for agency in social action is critical for the understanding of social cognition. There is one recent paper that suggests that people can learn to understand the contingencies between their saccades and a bouncing ball stimulus on a screen (Grgič, Crespi, & de'Sperati, 2016) , which is an initial piece of evidence that the effects of saccades can be explicitly self-attributed. However, explicitly measuring sense of agency does not provide a full picture and can be problematic. This is because explicit measures are somewhat limited as self-reported feelings of control over an action depend on the actor's own ability for introspection (Barlas & Obhi, 2013; David, Newen, & Vogeley, 2008; Sebanz & Lackner, 2007) . Moreover, as Gallagher (2012) points out, self-agency is not normally something of which we are typically aware. Explicit measures are further criticised for their susceptibility to response bias and impression management (Obhi, 2012) . Because of this, an alternative is to measure sense of agency implicitly with a measure that does not ask the participant to introspect about their explicit experience of control. Inferring 
